D. S.-W. v. USA by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-22-2020 
D. S.-W. v. USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"D. S.-W. v. USA" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 608. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/608 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






D.J.S.-W., a minor, by her natural mother  
and legal guardian, D’ERICKA STEWART, 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-17-cv-01335) 
Chief District Judge:  Honorable Mark R. Hornak 
______ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 22, 2020 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, RENDELL and FISHER, Circuit 
Judges. 
 




Vincent A. Coppola 
Pribanic Pribanic & Archinaco 
513 Court Place, First Floor 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Scott W. Brady, United States Attorney 
Haley F. Warden-Rodgers 
Laura S. Irwin 
Office of United States Attorney 
700 Grant Street, Suite 4000 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 Counsel for Appellee 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 D.J.S.-W., a young girl who sustained a shoulder injury 
during birth, argues that the limitations period for filing her 
medical malpractice claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–80, should be equitably 
tolled. Because D.J.S.-W. fails to show both that she diligently 
pursued her rights and that extraordinary circumstances 
prevented her from timely filing, we decline to accord her such 
an exceptional remedy. Accordingly, we will affirm the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the United 
States.   
I. 
In late 2009, D.J.S.-W. was born at Sharon Regional 
Health Center (Sharon Hospital) in Mercer County, 
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Pennsylvania, under the care of John Gallagher, M.D. During 
delivery, D.J.S.-W. sustained a brachial plexus injury, which 
allegedly caused permanent damage to her right shoulder and 
arm.  
In the next few months, D.J.S.-W.’s mother retained 
counsel to pursue D.J.S.-W.’s potential malpractice claims 
against Sharon Hospital and Dr. Gallagher. In 2010 and 2011, 
in preparing to file D.J.S.-W.’s case, counsel requested medical 
and billing records from Sharon Hospital on three occasions. 
During this time, counsel also sent one request for medical 
records directly to Dr. Gallagher. All four requests were 
limited temporally “to those records pertinent to the time when 
Dr. Gallagher’s alleged negligence occurred—the delivery of 
[D.J.S.-W.] . . . and the 12 hours prior to the delivery, the time 
at which [D.J.S.-W.’s mother] presented to Sharon . . . Hospital 
to give birth.” App. 204 ¶ 12. Beyond these record requests, 
counsel also visited Sharon Hospital’s website, which listed 
Dr. Gallagher as an Obstetrics & Gynecology doctor, and 
conducted a Google search of both Sharon Hospital and Dr. 
Gallagher.  
D.J.S.-W.’s counsel believed that Dr. Gallagher was 
privately employed because Dr. Gallagher delivered D.J.S.-W. 
at Sharon Hospital—an entity against which counsel had 
previously litigated and knew to be private—and was listed on 
the Sharon Hospital website. Despite his investigatory efforts 
in preparing to file her case, D.J.S.-W.’s counsel did not 
discover that at the time of D.J.S.-W.’s birth, Dr. Gallagher 
was employed by Primary Health Network, a “deemed” federal 
entity eligible for FTCA malpractice coverage. Under federal 
law, entities that receive federal funding to serve medically 
underserved populations, as well as “health practitioners that 
such entities employ[,] ‘shall be deemed to be [employees] of 
the Public Health Service.’” Lomando v. United States, 667 
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F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 2011) (second alteration in original) 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)(1)(A)). This status “is highly 
significant” because “an action against the United States under 
the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for persons alleging 
‘personal injury . . . resulting from the performance of medical 
. . . functions’ by Public Health Service employees acting 
within the scope of their employment.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 233(a)). Indeed, D.J.S.-W.’s counsel had litigated a prior case 
in which the United States substituted itself for a defendant 
doctor because he was a “deemed” federal employee.  
During the preparation of D.J.S.-W.’s case, counsel did 
not visit or call Sharon Hospital, Dr. Gallagher, or any Primary 
Health Network office. He did not search the Health Resources 
and Services Administration database, which would have 
revealed that Primary Health Network was a “deemed” federal 
entity (although, at the time, it did not list individual providers 
like Dr. Gallagher). Nor did counsel visit Primary Health 
Network’s website or search Primary Health Network on 
Google. At the time, its website and each of its offices 
indicated that Primary Health Network was a “Federally 
Qualified Health Center.” 
Furthermore, counsel never requested medical records 
from Primary Health Network, nor did he ask for records from 
any healthcare provider or facility that identified a responsive 
date range earlier than D.J.S.-W.’s birth in November 2009. 
Records from before D.J.S.-W.’s birth, however, show that at 
the time of her birth, her mother had been a patient of Dr. 
Gallagher’s for over ten years and had visited the Primary 
Health Network office in Sharon, Pennsylvania. Of the medical 
records counsel did ask for, he sent one request directly to 
“John Gallagher, M.D., One Dayton Way, Suite 6, Sharon, PA 
16146”—the street address of a Primary Health Network 
office. App. 236. And of the records Dr. Gallagher sent in 
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response to counsel’s request, two pages included the words 
“Primary Health Network” at the bottom of the page 
immediately above Dr. Gallagher’s name and mailing address. 
D.J.S.-W. v. United States, No. 2:17-cv-01335, 2019 WL 
1894707, at *3, *11 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2019).  
In late 2016—nearly seven years after the allegedly 
negligent delivery—D.J.S.-W.’s mother filed suit on D.J.S.-
W.’s behalf against Dr. Gallagher and Sharon Hospital in 
Pennsylvania state court. Despite Pennsylvania’s two-year 
limitation for bringing personal injury actions, see 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 5524(2), D.J.S.-W.’s counsel, “[a]cting according to his 
custom and practice,” deliberately delayed filing D.J.S.-W.’s 
case “in anticipation of acquiring additional knowledge 
regarding the severity and permanency of [her] injuries,” App. 
211 ¶ 72. In doing so, counsel relied on a Pennsylvania statute, 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533(b)(1), which tolls a minor plaintiff’s 
action until she turns eighteen. 
Soon after the case was filed, the Government removed 
it to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania and moved to substitute the United States for Dr. 
Gallagher because he was working within the scope of his 
federal employment with Primary Health Network at the time 
of the allegedly negligent delivery. The District Court granted 
the motion for substitution, at which point the United States 
moved to dismiss on the basis that D.J.S.-W. failed to timely 
exhaust her administrative remedies as required under the 
FTCA. The District Court then dismissed the case against the 
United States without prejudice and remanded the case against 
Sharon Hospital for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.1 
 
1 The case against Sharon Hospital was still pending in state 
court when the parties briefed this appeal. 
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After exhausting administrative remedies,2 D.J.S.-W.’s 
counsel filed anew D.J.S.-W.’s claim against the United States 
in the District Court. The United States moved to dismiss, 
arguing that her action was untimely under the FTCA. The 
District Court denied the motion, ordering the parties to engage 
in limited discovery regarding the FTCA’s statute of 
limitations and equitable tolling. 
At the close of discovery, the United States moved for 
summary judgment, again arguing that D.J.S.-W.’s suit was 
untimely. Although conceding that she did not timely file, 
D.J.S.-W. argued that she was entitled to equitable tolling of 
the FTCA’s limitations period because she—or more 
accurately, her counsel—“had no reason to know that [Dr. 
Gallagher] was a ‘deemed’ federal employee or that further 
inquiry into his status was required.” Supp. App. 26. The 
District Court disagreed, holding that D.J.S.-W. failed to “meet 
her burden to obtain the extraordinary remedy of equitable 
tolling.” D.J.S.-W., 2019 WL 1894707, at *10. Accordingly, 
the Court granted the Government’s motion for summary 
judgment because D.J.S.-W.’s “negligence claim against the 
United States is . . . barred as untimely.” Id. D.J.S.-W. appeals.  
II.3 
“As a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit 
unless it consents to be sued.” Sconiers v. United States, 896 
 
2 D.J.S.-W. presented her claims to the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services. Her administrative claim was 
deemed denied when the agency failed to act within six 
months. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).  
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1346(b)(1), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. “Our review of the District Court’s [summary 
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F.3d 595, 597 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting White-Squire v. U.S. 
Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010)). The FTCA 
represents “a limited waiver of th[at] sovereign immunity,” 
Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 193 (3d 
Cir. 2009), providing that “[t]he United States shall be liable, 
respecting . . . [certain] tort claims, in the same manner and to 
the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances,” 28 U.S.C. § 2674.  
Bringing a claim under the FTCA requires following 
various procedural requirements. The FTCA dictates that “a 
tort claim against the United States ‘shall be forever barred’ 
unless it is presented to the ‘appropriate Federal agency within 
two years after [it] accrues’ and then brought to federal court 
‘within six months’ after the agency acts on the claim.” United 
States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 405 (2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2401(b)). If the agency fails to act within six months, the 
claimant may proceed to file her case in district court. 28 
U.S.C. § 2675(a).  
Here, both parties agree that D.J.S.-W.’s case—which 
was first filed in state court almost seven years after her birth, 
the date on which her claim accrued—was not timely presented 
to the appropriate agency in accordance with these 
requirements. And although D.J.S.-W.’s counsel deliberately 
delayed filing her case in reliance on Pennsylvania’s tolling 
statute, that law cannot save D.J.S.-W.’s untimely claim 
against the United States because “state-law tolling statutes do 
 
judgment] decision is plenary.” State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. v. 
Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009). Summary 
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
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not apply to the FTCA’s limitations period.” Santos, 559 F.3d 
at 193. Thus, the sole issue on appeal is whether D.J.S.-W. has 
shown that she is entitled to the extraordinary remedy of 
equitable tolling of the FTCA’s limitations period.4 We first 
clarify the test that a litigant seeking equitable tolling must 
satisfy. We then explain why D.J.S.-W. fails to meet that 
standard in this case.  
A. Our Equitable-Tolling Test 
It is well established that a court may “rescue a claim 
otherwise barred as untimely by a statute of limitations when a 
plaintiff [shows she] has ‘been prevented from filing in a 
timely manner due to sufficiently inequitable circumstances.’” 
Id. at 197 (quoting Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 
165 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)). Tolling “is [an] 
extraordinary” remedy, id., and “is proper only when the 
‘principles of equity would make [the] rigid application [of a 
limitation period] unfair,” Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of Corr., 
145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Shendock v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Programs, 893 F.2d 1458, 1462 (3d Cir. 1990) (en banc)). “It 
is especially appropriate to be restrictive” in extending this 
remedy “in cases involving the waiver of the sovereign 
immunity of the United States,” such as those arising under the 
FTCA. Santos, 559 F.3d at 197–98. 
Our Court uses the term “equitable tolling” broadly to 
encompass several situations under which a statute of 
limitations period may be tolled on equitable grounds. We have 
said that: 
 
4 “The time limits in the FTCA are just time limits,” not 
jurisdictional requirements, and, therefore, “a court can toll 
them on equitable grounds.” Wong, 575 U.S. at 412. 
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[T]here are three principal, though not exclusive, 
situations in which equitable tolling may be 
appropriate: (1) where the defendant has actively 
misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff’s 
cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some 
extraordinary way has been prevented from 
asserting . . . her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff 
has timely asserted . . . her rights mistakenly in 
the wrong forum.5 
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 
1387 (3d Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Rotkiske 
v. Klemm, 890 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 2018) (en banc), aff’d 
140 S. Ct. 355 (2019). In addition, a litigant “will not receive 
the benefit of” tolling in any of these situations “unless she 
 
5 Our Court often refers to all three of these situations “as 
falling under the overarching heading of ‘equitable tolling’” 
because each “tolls a limitations period on equitable grounds.” 
Edmonson v. Eagle Nat’l Bank, 922 F.3d 535, 550 (4th Cir. 
2019) (describing the Third Circuit’s approach). Other circuits 
use the phrase to refer only to the second situation in our list—
that is, “when a plaintiff’s failure to timely file suit is not 
attributable [to] wrongful conduct by the defendant.” Id.; see 
also Zappone v. United States, 870 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 
2017); Valdez ex rel. Donely v. United States, 518 F.3d 173, 
183 (2d Cir. 2008); Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 
446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990). In recent years, the Supreme Court 
has also used the phrase “equitable tolling” in this more 
specific sense. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 644–45 
(2010). As we explain above, only the second of our three 
tolling scenarios is at issue here, so we need not (and do not) 
resolve the difference in terminology.  
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exercised due diligence in pursuing and preserving her claim.” 
Santos, 559 F.3d at 197. That is, tolling will never extend to “a 
garden variety claim of excusable neglect, such as a simple 
miscalculation that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline.” 
Holland, 560 U.S. at 651–52 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 The second tolling situation is at issue here—D.J.S.-W. 
argues that she encountered extraordinary circumstances that 
prevented her from timely filing.6 Thus, to be entitled to 
equitable tolling, D.J.S.-W. must show that she “in some 
extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting . . . her 
rights,” and that she “exercised due diligence in pursuing and 
preserving her claim.” See Santos, 559 F.3d at 197 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). This is the same test that the 
Supreme Court uses to assess whether a petitioner may be 
entitled to equitable tolling in the habeas context. See Holland, 
560 U.S. at 649 (“[A] ‘petitioner’ is ‘entitled to equitable 
tolling’ only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his 
rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance 
stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” (quoting Pace 
v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005))). In Menominee 
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, the Supreme Court 
applied the same test to assess a Tribe’s claim that equitable 
 
6 D.J.S.-W. does not explicitly state that her claim falls under 
the second tolling situation in our list. But her argument relies 
heavily on Santos, which involved the second tolling doctrine. 
See 559 F.3d at 203. Furthermore, neither of the other two 
bases applies—D.J.S.-W. does not argue that she was actively 
misled, and all parties agree that she did not timely assert her 
claim in state court. Nor does D.J.S.-W. argue that any other 
tolling doctrine should apply.  
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tolling should excuse its failure to timely present a contract 
dispute to a federal contracting officer. 136 S. Ct. 750, 754–56 
(2016). In doing so, the Court noted that it has “never held that 
[Holland’s] equitable-tolling test necessarily applies outside 
the habeas context” and, therefore, it has not yet “decide[d] 
whether an even stricter” or “a more generous test” may apply 
to nonhabeas cases. Id. at 756 n.2.7 
Nevertheless, because the Holland test is the same as 
our test for assessing equitable tolling in the nonhabeas 
context, Menominee is instructive. In particular, the Court 
made two observations that help us more clearly define the 
contours of our test.  
First, it stated that the two requirements—extraordinary 
circumstances and diligence—are “distinct elements,” both of 
which must be satisfied for a litigant to be eligible for tolling. 
Id. at 756. Treating the two requirements as separate prongs, 
the Court said, was consistent with its prior language 
describing the components as “elements,” id. (citing Pace, 544 
U.S. at 418), and its practice of denying “requests for equitable 
tolling where a litigant failed to satisfy one without addressing 
whether he satisfied the other,” id. (citing Lawrence v. Florida, 
549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007), and Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).  
We agree with this characterization of the equitable-
tolling test. Although our prior case law may appear to have 
blended the two components, this is merely a reflection of the 
fact that, in practice, the two elements often go hand in hand. 
For example, if no extraordinary circumstances stood in the 
 
7 In recent years, the Court has also referenced the Holland 
equitable-tolling test in other nonhabeas cases. See, e.g., Wong, 




litigant’s way, but she nevertheless failed to timely file, it is 
likely that she did not diligently investigate and pursue her 
claim. See, e.g., id. at 756–57 (declining to equitably toll 
limitations period because Tribe’s failure to timely present its 
claims was caused “not by an obstacle outside its control, but 
by [its] mistaken belief that presentment was unneeded”); 
Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 752–54 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(declining to equitably toll limitations period because 
plaintiff’s pro se status and mental incompetence were not 
extraordinary circumstances and “[d]iligent research would 
likely have revealed . . . the existence” of his claim). Similarly, 
if, despite pursuing her claim diligently, a litigant was still 
unable to timely file, it is likely that some extraordinary 
circumstance stood in her way and prevented her from doing 
so. See Santos, 559 F.3d at 198–203 (holding plaintiff entitled 
to equitable tolling when she “diligently and vigorously 
pursued her claim” and, yet, she was unable to ascertain 
hospital’s federal status). Today, we follow Menominee’s 
guidance and confirm that the two requirements are distinct 
prongs, both of which a litigant must satisfy before equitable 
tolling may apply. 
Second, the Supreme Court also “reaffirm[ed]” that the 
extraordinary-circumstances element “is met only where the 
circumstances that caused a litigant’s delay are both 
extraordinary and beyond [her] control.” Menominee, 136 S. 
Ct. at 756. We agree with this description of the extraordinary-
circumstances prong. Indeed, because equitable tolling is an 
extreme remedy that we extend “only sparingly,” Irwin v. 
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990), it “would 
make little sense if [it] were available when a litigant was 
responsible for [her] own delay,” Menominee, 136 S. Ct. at 
756. In addition, because the extraordinary-circumstances and 
diligence components are distinct elements, “the diligence 
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prong already covers those affairs within the litigant’s control” 
and the “extraordinary-circumstances prong, by contrast, is 
meant to cover matters outside [her] control.” Menominee, 136 
S. Ct. at 756. Accordingly, we also clarify today, following the 
Supreme Court’s guidance, that a litigant will only meet the 
extraordinary-circumstances prong of our test for equitable 
tolling when she shows that her delay was attributable to 
circumstances that were “both extraordinary and beyond [her] 
control.” Id. 
In sum, for a litigant to be entitled to equitable tolling, 
she must establish two elements: “(1) that [s]he has been 
pursuing her rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 
circumstance stood in h[er] way and prevented timely filing.” 
Id. at 755; see also Santos, 559 F.3d at 197. The two 
components are distinct elements, both of which the litigant 
must satisfy. And to meet the extraordinary-circumstances 
element, the litigant must show that the circumstances were 
“extraordinary and beyond [her] control.” Menominee, 136 S. 
Ct. at 756.  
B. D.J.S.-W. Fails to Meet Our Equitable-Tolling 
Standard 
Here, D.J.S.-W. fails to satisfy either prong of this test. 
She did not diligently pursue her rights because she failed to 
take reasonable steps to confirm Dr. Gallagher’s employment 
status. Nor did any circumstances, both extraordinary and 
outside her control, stand in her way and prevent her “from 
discovering Dr. Gallagher’s true affiliations.” D.J.S.-W., 2019 
WL 1894707, at *9 (citing Menominee,136 S. Ct. at 755). 
D.J.S.-W. emphasizes our decision in Santos, in which 
we tolled the FTCA’s limitations period to rescue Santos’s 
untimely claim because the government had created a trap that 
prevented her from learning, despite her counsel’s diligent 
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investigation, that her alleged tortfeasors were federally 
employed. 559 F.3d at 204. Santos is similar to this case: a 
minor filed medical malpractice claims in state court against a 
healthcare facility, known as York Health, and several of its 
employees. Id. at 190–91. Her counsel filed her suit after the 
two-year limitations period had run in reliance on 
Pennsylvania’s tolling statute. Id. at 191. As it turned out, 
however, York Health was a “deemed” federal entity. Id. at 
191–92. After the government substituted the United States as 
defendant and moved for summary judgment, Santos argued 
that the FTCA’s limitations period should be equitably tolled. 
Id. at 192. 
We agreed with Santos and reversed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment to the United States. Id. at 204. 
Santos, we said, diligently pursued her claim: she hired 
counsel, “who requested and reviewed her medical records, 
[and] visited, corresponded with, and performed a public 
records search on York Health.” Id. at 198. Yet, “[n]one of 
these inquiries, records, visits, or correspondence gave him a 
clue that the healthcare providers or York Health had been 
deemed federal employees.” Id. at 200–01. York Health’s 
federal status, we concluded, “if not covert, was at least 
oblique.” Id. at 202. Although York Health’s website indicated 
that it received funds from federal sources and that it was a 
“federally-qualified health center,” there were no “publicly 
available sources of information from which Santos could have 
learned” that York Health was in fact a federal entity. Id. at 
201–03. Moreover, “even if the information had been 
available,” there were no circumstances that “should have led 
[Santos’s counsel] to inquire into York Health’s federal status” 
in the first place. Id. at 203. Thus, we held that “the equitable 
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tolling doctrine applie[d] . . . to toll the FTCA’s statute of 
limitations.” Id. at 204.8 
Despite D.J.S.-W.’s arguments to the contrary, even a 
cursory read of Santos reveals that Santos’s counsel went to far 
greater lengths to confirm her alleged tortfeasors’ employment 
status than D.J.S.-W.’s counsel did here. While counsel in 
Santos performed a public records search on, corresponded 
with, and visited York Health as part of his investigation, 
D.J.S.-W.’s counsel merely assumed that Dr. Gallagher was 
employed by Sharon Hospital—which he knew to be a private 
entity—because D.J.S.-W. was born there and Dr. Gallagher 
was listed as a “team member” on its website. But, as D.J.S.-
W.’s counsel admits, he never corresponded with, called, or 
visited Sharon Hospital or Dr. Gallagher to confirm this belief. 
 
8 The Government argues that “Menominee may undermine the 
holding in Santos” because “Santos’s counsel’s erroneous 
belief that York Health was a private entity . . . was neither 
extraordinary nor ‘an obstacle beyond [his] control.’” 
Appellee’s Br. 25–26 (quoting Menominee, 136 S. Ct. at 756 
& n.3). We disagree. In Santos, we concluded that the 
government had created a “trap” for litigants like Santos 
because there were no “publicly available sources of 
information from which Santos could have” discovered York 
Health’s federal status, nor were there any circumstances that 
should have “led her to inquire into York Health’s federal 
status.” 559 F.3d at 203. Despite diligent research, the opacity 
of York Health’s federal status was an extraordinary 
circumstance that stood in Santos’s way and prevented her 
from timely filing. Thus, our holding in Santos would not 
change under the clarified test we discuss today. 
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D.J.S.-W. argues that her counsel’s efforts were diligent 
because there was no “trigger” that would have prompted him 
to examine Dr. Gallagher’s true employer, Primary Health 
Network. Appellant’s Br. 15. This is not so. There were 
numerous red flags that would have caused a diligent plaintiff 
or her counsel to investigate Dr. Gallagher’s employment 
status. As the District Court observed, “[i]t ordinarily should 
not come as a surprise to a medical malpractice lawyer . . . that 
an obstetric physician’s relationship to a hospital may simply 
be” that he has “admitting privileges to deliver his patients’ 
babies.” D.J.S.-W., 2019 WL 1894707, at *9 (internal footnote 
omitted). Given that such an arrangement is not uncommon, it 
seems strange that counsel did not either ask D.J.S.-W.’s 
mother “where she normally saw Dr. Gallagher for her pre-
natal care” or expand the temporal scope of his record request 
to ensure Dr. Gallagher had not treated her at another facility. 
Id.  
There were also other triggers that should have 
prompted counsel to investigate Dr. Gallagher’s employment 
status. For example, counsel’s own law office sent record 
requests to Sharon Hospital and Dr. Gallagher at different 
addresses. Indeed, had counsel visited or searched the address 
to which his office sent the request to Dr. Gallagher, he would 
have discovered that it was a street address for Primary Health 
Network. In addition, two of the pages of records sent by Dr. 
Gallagher in response to that request contained the phrase 
“Primary Health Network” at the bottom of the page above Dr. 
Gallagher’s name and address. See id. at *3, *11. Finally, 
D.J.S.-W.’s counsel should have been on heightened alert 
given his own personal experience in litigating a malpractice 
case involving the substitution of the United States for a 
defendant physician because he was an employee of a 
“deemed” federal entity.  
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Had counsel taken the reasonable step of investigating 
these red flags, he could have easily discovered that Dr. 
Gallagher was employed by Primary Health Network. Had 
counsel then investigated Primary Health Network, he could 
have discovered that it was a “deemed” federal entity. Indeed, 
unlike counsel in Santos, who corresponded with, performed a 
public search on, and visited York Health, D.J.S.-W.’s counsel 
did not take any of these steps. Had he visited a Primary Health 
Network office or searched its website, he would have seen that 
Primary Health Network “held itself out as a ‘federally 
qualified health center’ via,” inter alia, “physical signs in its 
waiting rooms . . . and notices on its website.” Id. at *9. If, like 
in Santos, these statements were insufficient to alert counsel to 
Primary Health Network’s “deemed” federal status, see Santos, 
559 F.3d at 201–02, he could have double checked by 
searching Primary Health Network in the Health Resources 
and Services Administration database.  
In sum, D.J.S.-W. did not exercise due diligence to meet 
our equitable-tolling standard. Rather, her effort here—or, 
more accurately, her counsel’s effort—was, at most, a “garden 
variety claim of excusable neglect,” see Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 
to which “[t]he principles of equitable tolling . . . do not 
extend,” Santos, 559 F.3d at 197. 
Because a plaintiff must meet both prongs of the 
equitable-tolling test, we could conclude our discussion here, 
having determined that D.J.S.-W. did not diligently pursue her 
claim. See Menominee, 136 S. Ct. at 757 n.5. We briefly note, 
however, that D.J.S.-W. also fails to demonstrate that any 
extraordinary circumstances “stood in h[er] way and prevented 
timely filing.” Id. at 755 (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 649). 
The plaintiff in Santos encountered extraordinary 
circumstances because the government had created “a potential 
statute of limitations trap” that prevented her from discovering 
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the defendant’s federal status. 559 F.3d at 202 (quoting Valdez, 
518 F.3d at 183). The government itself ensured that “York 
Health’s federal status, if not covert, was at least oblique,” and 
there were no “publicly available sources of information from 
which Santos could have learned this critical fact,” nor were 
there any “circumstances [that] should have led her to inquire 
into York Health’s federal status.” Id. at 203. 
According to D.J.S.-W., the circumstances in her case 
were similarly extraordinary. She argues that Dr. Gallagher 
created a trap, like that in Santos, because he knew that his 
biography on Sharon Hospital’s website “created the illusion” 
that he was employed by “that private hospital,” which could, 
in turn, “relax the guard of even the most diligent person.” 
Appellant’s Br. 14. There was, however, no trap here, and Dr. 
Gallagher’s employment with Primary Health Network was far 
from “oblique.” As discussed above, had counsel discussed the 
issue with his client, expanded the temporal scope of his record 
requests, called Sharon Hospital or Dr. Gallagher, or 
investigated the address to which he sent one of his record 
requests and which appeared on some of the records he 
received, he would have discovered Dr. Gallagher’s true 
employer. As the District Court stated, “[t]he real trap that . . . 
[c]ounsel fell into was the assumption that a doctor who has a 
biographical page on a private healthcare facility’s website . . . 
cannot be employed by another facility or entity.” D.J.S.-W., 
2019 WL 1894707, at *8. This miscalculation was certainly not 
“beyond [counsel’s] control,” and, thus, no extraordinary 
circumstances stood in D.J.S.-W.’s way to prevent her from 
timely filing her claim.9 See Menominee, 136 S. Ct. at 756. 
 
9 D.J.S.-W. argues that Dr. Gallagher “bore responsibility to 
make sure that his status was unambiguous to his patients.” 




Because we conclude that equitable tolling does not 
save D.J.S.-W.’s untimely claim, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the 
United States. 
 
that doctors like Dr. Gallagher who generally treat patients at 
private hospitals, “may not insulate [themselves] against 
application of equitable tolling” unless they notify “the patient 
in some reasonably direct manner of the federal affiliation.” 
Appellant’s Br. 15. But it is D.J.S.-W. who bore the burden to 
timely assert her rights or to show that, despite her diligent 
investigation, she was prevented from doing so by 
extraordinary circumstances. D.J.S.-W. offers no legal basis 
for imposing an affirmative reporting requirement on 
healthcare providers like Dr. Gallagher. See, e.g., Arteaga v. 
United States, 711 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2013) (“No 
physician, clinic, hospital, or other medical provider is required 
to provide patients with detailed instructions on how to sue the 
provider for malpractice.”); Hedges, 404 F.3d at 752 (rejecting 
argument that “the Government has an affirmative duty to 
inform litigants, including pro se litigants, that they have viable 
judicial . . . remedies”). 
 
